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Abstract
This study is the first to scrutinize the psychological effects of online astroturfing in the 
context of Russia’s digitally-enabled foreign propaganda. Online astroturfing is a 
communicative strategy that uses websites, “sock puppets,” or social bots to create the false 
impression that a particular opinion has widespread public support. We exposed N = 2,353 
subjects to pro-Russian astroturfing comments and tested: (1) their effects on political 
opinions and opinion certainty, and (2) the efficiency of three inoculation strategies to 
prevent these effects. All effects were investigated across three issues and from a short- and 
long-term perspective. Results show that astroturfing comments can indeed alter recipients’ 
opinions, and increase uncertainty, even when subjects are inoculated before exposure. We 
found exclusively short-term effects of only one inoculation strategy (refutational-same). As 
these findings imply, preemptive media literacy campaigns should deploy (1) continuous 
rather than one-time efforts and (2) issue-specific rather than abstract inoculation messages.
Keywords: disinformation, misinformation, Russia, state propaganda, online astroturfing, 
opinion certainty, uncertainty, countermeasures, inoculation
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THE DISCONCERTING POTENTIAL OF ONLINE DISINFORMATION 2
The disconcerting potential of online disinformation: Persuasive effects of astroturfing 
comments and three strategies for inoculation against them
Particularly in the aftermath of the 2016 US national election, disinformation and its 
consequences for democratic societies have been subject to extensive political (European 
Commission, 2018) and scholarly debate (e.g., Bennett & Livingston, 2018). At the most 
abstract level, disinformation can be understood as “[i]naccurate or manipulated information / 
content that is spread intentionally. This can include false news, or involve more subtle 
methods such as false flag operations, feeding inaccurate quotes or stories to innocent 
intermediaries, or knowingly amplifying biased or misleading information” (Weedon, 
Nuland, & Stamos, 2017, p. 5). Therefore, disinformation is also persuasive communication 
(Zhang, Carpenter, & Ko, 2013). In this paper, we deal with an important and widespread 
subtype of disinformation, known as “astroturfing” (Kovic, Rauchfleisch, Sele, & Caspar, 
2018; Zhang et al., 2013). Astroturfing can be defined as the “manipulative use of media and 
other political techniques to create the perception of a grassroots community organization 
where none exists for the purpose of political gain” (McNutt & Boland, 2007, p. 169). 
Although the phenomenon is not new, the Internet and especially social media have paved the 
way for new forms, often referred to as digital or online astroturfing (Kovic et al., 2018; 
Zhang et al., 2013). 
A central strategic instrument of online astroturfing is the manufacturing of user 
comments designed to appear as authentic citizen voices on highly visible news or social 
networking sites (SNS). We focus here on this specific form of online astroturfing because it 
has been one of the most widely debated in the context of national elections across the 
Western world (Ferrara, 2017; Kovic et al., 2018; Zelenkauskaite & Balduccini, 2017). 
Examples of targeted campaigns include the 2016 presidential election in the US (Bessi & 
Ferrara, 2016; Woolley & Guilbeault, 2017), the 2017 presidential election in France 
(Ferrara, 2017), and the 2012 presidential elections in South Korea (Keller, Schoch, Stier, & 
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THE DISCONCERTING POTENTIAL OF ONLINE DISINFORMATION 3
Yang, 2019). As a key sponsor of these astroturfing activities, various authors have pointed to 
Russia’s ruling elites (see, for instance, Bugorkova, 2015; Zelenkauskaite & Balduccini, 
2017), who are closely tied to an organization known as the Internet Research Agency (IRA) 
or Russia’s “troll factory” (Lysenko & Brooks, 2018; Ruck, Rice, Borycz, & Bentley, 2019). 
In 2013, this entity employed approximately 600 people with an estimated annual budget of 
US$ 10 million (Bugorkova, 2015). Amongst others, it targeted foreign audiences by setting 
up fake SNS accounts mimicking grassroots support for Russian policies on a range of news 
and social-media platforms (Bennett & Livingston, 2018; Kovic et al., 2018). 
Among Western political leaders, these digitally enabled propaganda efforts have 
sparked not only concern but explicit indignation (European Commission, 2018). In 
academia, they have stimulated a fast-growing body of research on the phenomenon. So far, 
however, this research has focused almost exclusively on how to identify fake accounts or 
automated social bots (Keller et al., 2019; King, Pan, & Roberts, 2017). By contrast, we still 
know very little about the psychological effects that such manufactured user comments exert 
on media audiences, and even less about possible ways of preventing them. Against this 
background, our study advances existing research in three ways:
(1) We examine whether online astroturfing comments affect the political opinions and 
opinion-certainty of those exposed to them.
(2) We investigate whether these persuasive effects can be mitigated, or even prevented, by 
inoculation messages designed to educate the audience about the manipulative intent and 
argumentative tactics of the astroturfing actors.
(3) We analyze the duration of the inoculation’s immunizing effects. 
Our study is based on a three-wave experiment (N = 2,353) carried out over the course 
of four weeks within the sociopolitical context of Germany. Participants were exposed to 
typical online astroturfing comments posted beneath social media news items and dealing 
with one of three issues prone to Russian astroturfing activities: the poisoning of former 
Page 3 of 43
https://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/nms






























































THE DISCONCERTING POTENTIAL OF ONLINE DISINFORMATION 4
Russian intelligence officer Sergei Skripal, the manipulation of the 2016 US presidential 
election, and the use of toxic gas by a close Russian ally, the Syrian government. All issues 
had been among the top stories on the Germany news agenda for several days. After 
exposure, we tested the comments’ persuasive effects, as well as the short and long-term 
efficiency of three different inoculation treatments in countering them.
The effects of astroturfing comments on personal opinions
Online astroturfing comments imitate ordinary citizens’ voices in order to create the 
impression that a certain opinion has widespread public support, while the real agent behind 
the message conceals his identity (Zhang et al., 2013). They are almost impossible to 
distinguish from authentic user comments; hence the audience find themselves in situations 
where they are either completely unaware of the fact that a comment might be sponsored by a 
principal, or they may suspect such an influence but cannot be entirely sure about it. Given 
their authentic appearance and the lack of knowledge, and/or uncertainty, on the part of 
audiences, astroturfing comments carry the potential to influence the opinions of those who 
read them. 
An answer to the question, how astroturfing comments can alter personal opinions is 
given by exemplification research, which investigates the effects of ordinary citizen 
depictions in the media (also known as “exemplars”) (Zillmann, 1999). Exemplars possess 
several characteristics contributing to their persuasive potential: firstly, as personalized 
information they attract the audience’s attention, making persuasive effects more likely in the 
first place (Taylor & Thompson, 1982). Secondly, the opinion voiced by an exemplar 
becomes cognitively available and accessible in the recipients’ memories (Zillmann, 1999), 
and thus has a greater chance of influencing subsequent judgments (Domke, Shah, & 
Wackman, 1998). Finally, fellow citizens are often considered to be more trustworthy and 
similar to ourselves by comparison with other actors in the media, such as e.g. politicians 
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THE DISCONCERTING POTENTIAL OF ONLINE DISINFORMATION 5
(Lefevere, Swert, & Walgrave, 2012). Trustworthiness and similarity have both been shown 
to be strong facilitators of persuasive effects (Hovland, Janis, & Kelley, 1953). 
Although, depictions of citizens seem to hold great potential to influence the opinions 
of those confronted with them, empirical evidence is rather mixed. Whereas some researchers 
have observed opinion changes resulting from exemplar exposure in traditional (e.g., 
Daschmann, 2000) and online media (e.g., Sikorski, 2018), others could not find such effects 
(e.g., Zerback & Peter, 2018). This leads to the question of why online astroturfing 
comments, in particular, should exert a persuasive influence. The answer lies in the way they 
are composed: in many cases, astroturfing comments do not merely consist of an opinion, but 
also include arguments that support the position advocated. An analysis by the EU vs. 
Disinformation project (2019) found that, particularly in the case of Russian propaganda, a 
common strategy was to offer alternative explanations for negative events for which Russia 
was being publicly accused. These pro-Russian astroturfing messages deny Russian 
responsibility, present alternative culprits, or portray Russia as the victim of unfounded 
Russophobia or public persecution (see also Nimmo, 2015). Persuasion research has 
repeatedly shown that arguments included in a message increase its persuasive impact (Petty 
& Cacioppo, 1984), which should also apply to astroturfing comments.
So far, only two studies have provided insights into the effects of astroturfing 
activities on audience attitudes, although in all these cases, researchers have not used online 
comments but other types of astroturfing information. In an experiment, Cho, Martens, Kim, 
and Rodrigue (2011) showed that people who were exposed to astroturf websites became 
more uncertain, as compared with those who saw real grassroots websites, about the causes of 
global warming and humans’ role in the phenomenon. Interestingly, these effects occurred 
despite the fact that participants had (correctly) perceived the information from the 
astroturfing websites to be less credible and the organization less trustworthy. In another 
study, Pfau, Haigh, Sims, and Wigley (2007) investigated the effects of corporate front-group 
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THE DISCONCERTING POTENTIAL OF ONLINE DISINFORMATION 6
stealth campaigns. Very similarly to astroturfing activities, these groups disseminate 
persuasive messages while masking their true identity and interests. After they were 
confronted with the disguised corporate messages, the opinions of those initially favoring 
restrictive policies on different issues were significantly eroded. Given the theoretical and 
empirical evidence, we assume that pro-Russian online comments will influence the opinions 
of those who read them. 
H1 Exposing individuals to pro-Russian astroturfing comments will change their opinions 
in the direction of the comments.
The effects of astroturfing comments on opinion certainty
Whereas an attitude or opinion represents a person’s evaluation of an object, situation, or 
person, attitude or opinion certainty refers to the extent to which one is confident in it (Gross, 
Holtz, & Miller, 1995). Certainty is an important dimension of attitudes and opinions, 
because it influences their stability, durability, and behavioral impact. There are several 
theoretical reasons why astroturfing comments can be expected to influence opinion 
certainty. Firstly, research has shown that opinion certainty can be altered by messages 
contradicting an existing opinion, because these decrease the structural consistency of the 
underlying beliefs or knowledge. Hence, information with contradictory evaluative 
implications should decrease opinion certainty (Smith, Fabrigar, MacDougall, & Wiesenthal, 
2008). Secondly, opinion certainty is influenced by the subjective ease with which opinion-
relevant information comes into an individual’s mind. If information supporting the opinion 
is easily cognitively retrieved (e.g., because the individual has recently been exposed to it), it 
is deemed more valid and thus fosters opinion certainty (Tormala, Petty, & Briñol, 2002). 
Conversely, easily retrieved counter-attitudinal information—as provided by astroturfing 
comments—should decrease certainty. Finally, people hold opinions with greater certainty 
when they perceive social consensus for them (e.g., Visser & Mirabile, 2004). As other 
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THE DISCONCERTING POTENTIAL OF ONLINE DISINFORMATION 7
studies have shown, online user comments can serve as indicators of such a consensus 
(Zerback & Fawzi, 2017). 
Although creating uncertainty among people in democratic societies is considered a 
central goal of political astroturfing (Zhang et al., 2013), only the previously mentioned study 
by Cho and colleagues (2011) and another by Kang and colleagues (2016), who replicated the 
former’s examination of uncertainty, have investigated such effects. Both show that exposure 
to astroturfing websites on global warming increases uncertainty regarding the causes of 
climate change and the role played by humans in this context. Based on the theoretical work 
and empirical studies described, we assume that counter-attitudinal astroturfing comments 
will decrease individual opinion certainty.
H2 Exposing individuals to pro-Russian astroturfing comments will decrease opinion 
certainty.
Inoculation as a countermeasure to the effects of astroturfing comments
Given the supposed effects of astroturfing comments, the question arises as to what can be 
done to neutralize them. One effective way to inhibit or even prevent the impact of persuasive 
attacks is to inoculate people against them (see Compton & Pfau, 2005). Inoculation theory 
explains this process by reference to a biological analogy (McGuire, 1964): resistance to 
future persuasive messages can be increased by administering a weakened version of the 
“virus” to the individual—in this case, the impending persuasive message. An inoculation 
procedure consists of two core elements: threat and refutational preemption (see Compton, 
2012 for an overview). Threat means that the individual receives a warning about a pending 
persuasive attack that will challenge its attitudes. Following this warning, the person is 
provided with information to strengthen the existing attitude. This second element is termed 
refutational preemption, and exists in two common variants: refutational-same preemptions 
raise and refute exactly the same arguments as used in the subsequent attack message, 
whereas refutational-different preemptions include arguments that are not part of the 
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THE DISCONCERTING POTENTIAL OF ONLINE DISINFORMATION 8
subsequent attack. Empirical studies have shown that both preemption types can increase 
resistance to attack messages (Banas & Rains, 2010; McGuire, 1964). 
Despite the promising potential of the inoculation approach, to our knowledge no 
study to date has investigated its effectiveness in the context of astroturfing campaigns, 
although leading scholars in the field have emphasized its benefits and suitability to counter 
contemporary forms of disinformation (van der Linden, Maibach, Cook, Leiserowitz, & 
Lewandowsky, 2017). While some researchers have tested the effectiveness of inoculation 
strategies in the context of mis- or disinformation, their studies do not deal with astroturfing 
campaigns or state-induced propaganda in general, but rather with conspiracy theories (Banas 
& Miller, 2013), media reports on climate change (Cook, Lewandowsky, & Ecker, 2017), and 
front-group stealth campaigns (Pfau et al., 2007). Nevertheless, all these studies confirm the 
effectiveness of inoculation in hampering the effects of persuasive messages on personal 
opinions.
Whereas the works described above focused on opinion change, Tormala and Petty 
(2002) offer an additional perspective that also allows to derive theoretical assumptions 
regarding opinion certainty. They argue that the mere experience of resisting a persuasive 
attack can increase certainty, but only when the attack is perceived to be strong. Although the 
authors clearly point out the differences between the inoculation approach and their 
theoretical conception, they state: “As long as resistance does occur, the stronger the attack is 
perceived to be, the stronger the predicted effects [on certainty] will be” (p. 1300). Because 
an inoculation message empowers resistance to a persuasive attack, we expect increased 
levels of opinion certainty in those who receive an inoculation treatment. This assumption has 
also been confirmed by empirical studies showing that attitude certainty increased after 
participants were inoculated against persuasive messages (Compton & Pfau, 2004; Pfau et al., 
2004). Therefore, we assume the following:
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THE DISCONCERTING POTENTIAL OF ONLINE DISINFORMATION 9
H3 Administering an inoculation treatment prior to astroturfing comments will inhibit the 
assumed persuasive effects on opinion change (H3a) and opinion certainty (H3b).
Durability of inoculation effects
One of the most challenging questions in the context of inoculation is how long it provides 
protection from persuasive messages. McGuire (1964) assumes that some time must pass 
between the inoculation and the attack in order to strengthen resistance. However, due to a 
declining motivation over time to defend one’s opinion, wear-out effects may occur, 
decreasing resistance in the long run (Insko, 1967). The co-occurrence of both processes led 
researchers to assume that the effectiveness of inoculation follows an inversely U-shaped 
curve, which brings up the question of the ideal time interval between inoculation and attack 
(Compton & Pfau, 2005). Empirical studies have used varying time intervals, ranging from 
attack messages immediately following the inoculation treatment to intervals of several 
months. In their meta-analysis, Banas and Rains (2010) found some support for a declining 
immunizing effect when they compared short (immediate attack message), moderate (attack 
message after 13 days), and long (attack message after 14 days or later) intervals. However, 
the decline was not significant. In his literature review, Compton (2012) found some 
indication of a drop in resistance after a two-week period. Hence, we propose the following 
research question:
RQ1 Will inoculation effects on opinion change (H3a) and opinion certainty (H3b) still 
exist after a two-week delay between inoculation and the astroturfing comments? 
Method
Our study is based on a three-wave online experiment employing a 3 (issue) x 5 (inoculation) 
x 2 (delay between inoculation and attack message) between subject design. Participants were 
recruited via a commercial online access panel (Consumer Fieldwork) in September 2018 and 
were randomly assigned to one of the experimental conditions. 2,353 subjects took part in all 
three waves of the experiment.1 They were 48.8 years (SD = 15.2) old on average; 44.4 % 
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THE DISCONCERTING POTENTIAL OF ONLINE DISINFORMATION 10
possessed the highest German high-school degree, and 49.9 % were female. We opted to 
conduct our study in the German context, primarily for reasons of political relevance. 
Germany is one of the EU’s most powerful member states and, according to expert opinion 
(van Herpen, 2015), one of the prime targets of Moscow’s recent propaganda efforts. In 
addition, we assumed that the psychological mechanisms underlying the hypothesized effects 
should be broadly valid across different cultural contexts (for potential risks of generalizing 
to other contexts, see Discussion).
Stimulus and procedure
Because online astroturfing comments often occur in the context of journalistic content 
(Kovic et al., 2018), our experimental stimulus consisted of a fictitious Facebook news teaser 
ostensibly from the largest German television newscast Tagesschau. To increase the 
generalizability of the results, we produced three identically designed teasers, each consisting 
of the Tagesschau logo, a picture, the story’s headline, and a short lead text (screenshots are 
included in the Online Appendix). The teasers differed, however, with regard to the Russia-
related issue they dealt with. Two of the issues (the murder attempt on Sergei Skripal and the 
manipulation of the 2016 US election) related to direct Russian involvement. The third issue 
(the use of toxic gas in Syria) involved the Syrian government—a close ally of Russia. Each 
of the three teasers blamed either the Russian (issues one and two) or the Syrian governments 
(issue three) for the calamity.
Furthermore, each teaser was accompanied by two user comments representing 
typical astroturfing attack messages. In constructing the astroturfing messages, we followed 
the analysis of the EU vs. Disinformation initiative, which identified the most prevalent 
argumentative figures used by Russian propagandists (EU vs. Disinformation, 2019). 
Specifically, the astroturfing comments all expressed doubt regarding Russian/Syrian 
involvement in the event, offering arguments supporting this position and alternative 
explanations. To make sure that the strength of the arguments did not differ between the 
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THE DISCONCERTING POTENTIAL OF ONLINE DISINFORMATION 11
different issues, all comments were pre-tested by 17 to 20 subjects who were not part of the 
final study. All arguments were perceived to be moderately strong, with no significant 
differences between the issues (see Table 1, Online Appendix).
[FIGURE 1]
The three waves took place between September and October 2018 (Figure 1). In wave 
one, we measured participants’ prior opinions and opinion certainty for all three issues and 
collected socio-demographic information. To avoid raising suspicion regarding the true goal 
of these questions, the first wave took place two weeks before the actual stimulus 
presentation. In addition, all issue-specific questions were embedded in larger item sets also 
encompassing other issues. Two weeks later, in wave two, participants received a second 
questionnaire including the inoculation treatments. In line with our theoretical outline, three 
different inoculation messages were administered. The threat only condition (IC1) included 
only a warning about commenters paid by the Russian government, who attempt to sway 
citizens’ opinions regarding the respective issue. In the refutational-different condition (IC2), 
subjects received the same warning, but were additionally informed about the general 
persuasive strategies employed, namely, that the commenters would try to offer alternative 
explanations for the event in order to exonerate Russia/Syria. Subjects were also told that 
these alternative explanations contradicted independent official investigations of the events. 
Similarly, in the refutational-same condition (IC3), subjects were warned about the 
persuasive attack and informed about the strategy; however, this time by telling them the 
exact arguments that the commentators would use (see the Online Appendix for the 
inoculation messages). 
In order to determine the persuasive effects of the astroturfing comments on opinions 
and opinion certainty (H1 and H2), the inoculation factor also included two additional control 
conditions, in which subjects did not receive an inoculation treatment. In control condition 1 
(CC1) participants were only exposed to the news teaser, in CC2 they saw the teaser 
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THE DISCONCERTING POTENTIAL OF ONLINE DISINFORMATION 12
including the comments. Consequently, differences between the two control groups indicate 
the astroturfing comments’ effects. 
To assess the durability of the inoculation (RQ1), all subjects in wave two received 
the inoculation treatment; however, half of them saw the teaser including the comments 
immediately after the inoculation, the other half two weeks later (wave three).
Measures
Because all astroturfing comments were intended to raise doubt about Russian/Syrian 
involvement in the events presented, we asked our participants specifically for their opinion 
on the Russian/Syrian government’s responsibility for the event, and how certain they were 
of this opinion. Subjects’ opinions were measured using a five-point Likert scale indicating 
agreement with the statement that Russia/Syria was responsible for the event described in the 
news teaser (1 “Do not agree” to 5 “Fully agree”). The measure for opinion certainty was 
adopted from Tormala and Petty (2002), asking how certain the subjects were of the opinion 
indicated (1 “Not certain at all” to 5 “Extremely certain”). Subtracting participants’ post-
stimulus from their pre-stimulus answers, resulted in two scores, reflecting changes in 
opinion and opinion certainty (opinion change: MSyria = 0.24; SDSyria = 1.04; MSkripal = 0.33; 
SDSkripal = 1.07; MUS election = 0.30; SDUS election = 1.00; change in opinion certainty: MSyria = 
0.27; SDSyria = 1.27; MSkripal = 0.31; SDSkripal = 1.31; MUS election = 0.07; SDUS election = 1.21). 
Positive values of the opinion-change measure indicate that respondents held Russia/Syria 
less responsible for the events after seeing the stimulus. Positive values of the opinion-




Manipulation checks yielded satisfying results. Most subjects in the inoculation conditions 
correctly recalled having received an inoculation message (88.5%). Likewise, most subjects 
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THE DISCONCERTING POTENTIAL OF ONLINE DISINFORMATION 13
in the non-inoculation conditions correctly remembered that they had not seen such a 
message (87.9 %), χ²(2, N = 2221) = 1281.99, p = .000. Similarly, most of the participants 
who were exposed to astroturfing comments correctly remembered having seen comments 
beneath the news teaser (77.1%), as did those in the non-comment condition, where 73.8% 
stated that they had not seen any comments, χ²(2, N = 2233) = 540.66, p = .000.
Effects of online astroturfing comments on opinions and opinion certainty
To test whether the online astroturfing comments affected participants’ opinions, we first 
focus on the two control conditions and compare participants who only saw the news teaser 
(CC1) to those additionally exposed to the astroturfing comments (CC2). Figure 2 depicts 
opinion changes in both groups (see Table 2, Online Appendix for means and statistical 
tests). In order to test for group differences, we followed Hayes (2005) and dummy-coded the 
inoculation factor. K-1 dummy variables entered a linear regression model as independents. 
The respective comparison group served as the reference category. Besides testing for 
significant mean differences, the unstandardized regression coefficient b indicates the 
direction and magnitude of the mean difference between the two groups.
Firstly, it is interesting to see that, over the course of the two weeks between the pre- 
and post-stimulus measurements, subjects in all issue conditions became more supportive of 
the Russian/Syrian position. However, while this effect was only marginal in the news-teaser-
only condition (CC1) (M = 0.12, SD = 0.96), it was clearly pronounced for those who had 
been exposed both to the news teaser and to the online astroturfing comments (M = 0.42, SD 
= 1.08). Put differently, those who found pro-Russian/pro-Syrian astroturfing comments 
beneath the news teaser ascribed significantly less responsibility to Russia/Syria for the 
event, b = 0.30, p < .001. From a cross-issue perspective, H1 can thus be confirmed. 
However, a closer inspection of the issue-specific patterns shows that the astroturfing 
comments’ effect can mainly be traced back to the Skripal case, b = 0.54, p = .000, and 
somewhat to the Syria issue, b = 0.21, p = .09. Hence, H1 finds support only in this case.
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THE DISCONCERTING POTENTIAL OF ONLINE DISINFORMATION 14
[FIGURES 2 and 3]
We further assumed that astroturfing comments would increase uncertainty in those who 
initially thought that Russia/Syria was responsible for the negative events (H2). Therefore, 
unlike in the previous analysis, we confine our examination to subjects who had initially seen 
the two states as culprits (indicated by values of pre-stimulus opinions of 4 or 5; N = 995). 
Figure 3 shows that, astroturfing comments affected opinion certainty in the expected 
direction across all issue conditions (see Table 3, Online Appendix for means and statistical 
tests). Again, when comparing the two control groups CC1 (M = 0.34, SD = 1.19) and CC2 
(M = 0.64, SD = 1.11), participants who saw counter-attitudinal astroturfing comments 
became significantly more uncertain of their initial view that Russia/Syria were to blame, b = 
0.30, p = .009, as compared with those who did not see the comments. Again, an issue-
specific examination shows that the effect was only significant in the Skripal scenario, b = 
0.58, p = .005. Therefore, H2 can only be confirmed in this case.
Effects of inoculation treatments
In a next step, we examine whether the three inoculation strategies were able to prevent the 
effects of the astroturfing comments. To do so, we compare the three groups which saw the 
astroturfing comments after being inoculated (IC1, IC2, and IC3) to the group which received 
them without prior inoculation (CC2). An effective inoculation treatment should have 
prevented opinion change, ideally reducing it to the level of those who had only seen the 
news teaser without any astroturfing comments (CC1). A visual inspection of Figure 2 
supports this notion, at least for the refutational-same inoculation treatment (IC3), b = -0.20, 
p = .007: participants who were educated in advance about Russia’s persuasive goals and 
exact arguments were less influenced by the astroturfing comments (M = 0.22, SD = 1.05) as 
compared with non-inoculated subjects (M = 0.42, SD = 1.08). In contrast, the remaining two 
inoculation strategies (threat only: b = -0.04, p = .561; refutational-different: b = -0.06, p = 
.391) did not prevent opinion change. A further issue-specific examination of the data shows 
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that the overall effect of the refutational-same preemption was largely rooted in the Skripal 
and Syria cases. Multiple group comparisons indicate that the refutational-same strategy 
reduced opinion change in both issue conditions to a sufficient level, leading to a significant 
difference from non-inoculated participants receiving comments (CC2) (bSyria = -0.24, p = 
.06; bSkripal = -0.36, p = .01) and a non-significant difference from those who had only seen 
the news teaser (CC1) (bSyria = -0.03, p = .84; bSkripal = 0.18, p = .15). Hence, H3a finds 
support in these two cases (see Table 2, Online Appendix for means and statistical tests).
Following the previous logic, we finally examined the efficiency of inoculation in 
relation to opinion-certainty changes (H3b). Again, the visual patterns in Figure 3 seem to 
support the effectiveness of the refutational-same treatment, which hampered the increase in 
uncertainty (M = 0.43, SD = 1.19) as compared to non-inoculated subjects in CC1 (M = 0.64, 
SD = 1.11), although not to a highly significant extent, b = -0.21, p = .07. As Table 3 (Online 
Appendix) shows, none of the three inoculation strategies was able to prevent changes in 
opinion certainty within the single-issue conditions significantly.
Duration of inoculation effects
In a final step, we examined how long the observed immunization effect persisted (RQ1). The 
two lines in Figure 4 represent the different delay conditions implemented in our experiment 
(immediate and delayed astroturfing attack). It is important to recall that delay represents a 
between factor, so for each delay condition, we collected data across all inoculation groups. 
[FIGURE 4]
As can be seen, the two lines mostly parallel each other, with only minor and non-significant 
differences (see Table 4 in Online Appendix for means and statistical tests). However, there 
is one noteworthy exception, which manifests itself in a nearly significant interaction effect 
between inoculation and delay, F(4, 2054) = 2.23, p = .06. The refutational-same treatment, 
which was the most potent in reducing opinion changes, was only effective when 
administered immediately prior to the astroturfing comments (Mshort delay = 0.09, SDshort delay = 
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1.02), whereas its effect largely diminished after two weeks (Mlong delay = 0.36, SDlong delay = 
1.06), t(385) = -2.64, p = .01. When we look at the issue-specific short- and long-term effects, 
we find exactly the same pattern, but, again, only in the Skripal case, indicating a significant 
decrease over time in the immunizing effect of the refutational-same treatment (Mshort delay = -
0.13, SDshort delay = 1.10; Mlong delay = 0.60, SDlong delay = 1.12), t(135) = -3.18, p = .002. 
Corresponding mean differences in the Syria condition, t(118) = -0.233, p = .816, and US 
election condition, t(137) = -0.909, p = .365, could not be observed.
With regard to changes in opinion certainty, we found no significant three-way 
interaction between issue, inoculation strategy, and delay, F(8, 965) = 0.55, p = .820. Short- 
and long-term inoculation effects on opinion certainty did not differ significantly across the 
three issue conditions.
Discussion
In this paper, we examined the persuasive effects of astroturfing comments posted beneath 
news items on Facebook in the context of Russia-related issues. The results show that 
astroturfing comments can indeed change audiences’ political opinions and increase 
uncertainty. However, these effects did not occur equally across the issues. While we could 
clearly observe effects in the Skripal case and to some extent in the Syria scenario, we could 
not find them in the context of the manipulations of the 2016 US presidential election. 
Against this background, the question arises as to what caused the issue-specific 
differences. We see several possible explanations. The first reason could be that participants’ 
initial opinions were already less certain in the Skripal and the Syria conditions and therefore 
easier to influence by the astroturfing attacks. However, our data does not support this 
interpretation. On the contrary, a comparison of pre-stimulus opinion-certainty scores shows 
that Syria and Skripal were the cases with the highest initial certainty levels (MSyria = 3.38, 
SDSyria = 1.32; MSkripal = 3.31, SDSkripal = 1.31; MUS election = 3.22, SDUS election = 1.23), F(2, 
4314) = 17.984, p = .000, η² = .008. A second possibility might be that differences in issue 
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involvement account for the effect patterns. Highly involved individuals are more likely to 
scrutinize the quality of the arguments included in a persuasive message (Petty & Cacioppo, 
1984), hence the impact of the astroturfing comments could have been stronger for more 
involving issues. To test this explanation, we analyzed pre-stimulus involvement scores, 
which were measured by two items (“I think the issue is important”, “I am interested in the 
issue”) on a five point Likert scale reaching from 1 “Do not agree at all” to 5 “Totally agree”. 
The resulting scale showed good reliability (αSyria = .86, αSkripal = .88, αUS election = .83). A 
comparison of pre-stimulus involvement indeed shows significant differences between the 
three issues. Involvement was highest in the case of Syria (M = 3.90, SD = 1.08), followed by 
the US election (M = 3.47, SD = 1.18) and Skripal (M = 3.18, SD = 1.18), F(2, 4619) = 
522.282, p = .000, η² = .183. This implies two things: first, participants perceived all issues to 
be at least moderately important and relevant; second, the involvement pattern does not really 
correspond to the issue specific effect diffe ences observed. For example, Skripal, as the issue 
with the strongest astroturfing effects, was also the least involving one for our participants. 
Another reason for the differential effects might be that respondents’ opinions about the US 
presidential election and Syria represented more abstract scenarios and were therefore more 
difficult to process, especially when someone offers alternative explanations for them. The 
Skripal case, on the other hand, as a more narrowly defined and concrete event, makes it 
easier to understand and accept possible explanations. Unfortunately, our data did not enable 
us to test this assumption. 
In addition to the examination of the effects of astroturfing comments, this study also 
advances research on inoculation, being the first to transfer the approach to an online 
astroturfing context. As former studies have shown, inoculation can help to confer on 
individuals cognitive resistance to “a range of falsehoods in diverse domains such as climate 
change, public health, and emerging technologies” (van der Linden et al., 2017, p. 1141). 
Contrary to these expectations, only one strategy was effective in mitigating the persuasive 
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impact of astroturfing comments: when subjects were educated in advance about the exact 
arguments deployed by the Russians (refutational-same), changes in opinions and opinion 
certainty were prevented. However, even the immunizing effect of the refutational-same 
treatment was only short-lived and vanished almost completely after a two-week delay. This 
finding is in line with other inoculation studies in the context of political issues (Pfau & 
Burgoon, 1988).
The potentially negative effects of immunizing citizens against astroturfing comments
With regard to transferring inoculation research to the realm of astroturfing comments, 
perhaps the most difficult problem relates to the fact that such comments can typically not be 
distinguished from genuine citizens’ voices (the defining element of astroturfing). This poses 
a dilemma because, while inoculation messages might mitigate the harmful effects of 
astroturfing messages (positive consequence), they might also undermine the credibility of 
citizen commenting in public online spaces, and of online deliberation in general (negative 
consequence). This potential “side-effect” of inoculation campaigns (Compton, 2012, p. 15) 
could only be prevented if astroturfing comments were unambiguously identifiable and 
distinguishable from authentic citizen comments—which will almost never be the case. 
Those who initiate counter campaigns will thus have to make difficult decisions as to 
whether, and how, citizens can and should be inoculated against political astroturfing 
campaigns. Rather abstract threat-only treatments, for instance, can be disseminated with 
relatively limited costs and efforts. Yet these have the disadvantage that they undermine the 
credibility of online citizen debate around entire political issues. Moreover, they are, 
according to our findings, relatively inefficient. Highly specific refutational-same treatments, 
by contrast, can be very effective in mitigating the persuasive effects of astroturfing 
comments, as the findings of this study indicate. They also have the advantage that they 
discredit only those user comments that actually convey very narrowly defined pieces of 
misleading and inaccurate information. The downside of refutational-same inoculation 
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treatments is, however, that they require extensive resources to tailor and administer highly 
issue- and argument-specific counter messages.
Practical implications: how to inoculate audiences against astroturfing comments
Our results have at least two practical implications for how governments, social networking 
sites, news organizations, journalists and other actors can inoculate their audiences against 
astroturfing comments. First, given the limited effectiveness of threat-only and refutational-
different preemptions, relatively abstract inoculation messages grounded in these two 
strategies appear to bear little promise with regard to reducing the impact of astroturfing 
campaigns. Consequently, it is highly advisable to design and disseminate inoculation 
messages grounded in the refutational-same strategy – that is, messages that highlight the 
very arguments that are deployed later in the astroturfing attack. In order to create such 
highly issue-specific inoculation messages, publicly funded think tanks or government-
sponsored counterpropaganda units like the European Union’s “East Stratcom Task Force” 
(EU vs. Disinformation, 2019) are indispensable. These organizations are required to 
continuously collect and analyze information about ongoing astroturfing campaigns. Their 
regular reports should not only highlight those high-profile political events, which are 
allegedly being targeted by astroturfing actors, but also feature the key argumentative 
strategies deployed. This type of analysis then needs to be channeled to media and political 
actors, who can use it to create issue-specific inoculation messages. Secondly, the short-term 
nature of the effects (even of refutational-same treatments) detected in our study implies that 
inoculation messages are most efficient if they are presented to an audience immediately 
before this audience receives astroturfing comments. In practical terms, this means that the 
most promising strategy for administering this type of inoculation messages appears to be 
banners or warnings placed in the immediate vicinity of commenting fields. Media and 
political actors need to inoculate their audiences “just in time”. At a more abstract level, with 
regard to media literacy campaigns in general, our findings suggest that such campaigns are 
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most effective when (a) designed as continuous rather than one-time efforts and (b) deploying 
issue-specific (“refutational-same”) rather than abstract (“threat-only”) messages.
Limitations and promising paths for future research
Our study also has limitations. Although we increased external validity by including three 
different issues in our design and by investigating the short- and long-term effects of 
astroturfing and inoculation messages, we still relied on results gathered in an experimental 
setting. Participants were purposely exposed to stimuli that they otherwise might not have 
encountered, for example because they did not use social media or did not read the comments 
beneath news articles. In this sense, the effects of comments that we found probably 
overestimate the effect on society as a whole. On the other hand, participants in our 
experiment were only exposed once to the astroturfing comments and to the inoculation 
messages. In a real-world environment, people probably encounter comments repeatedly, 
which enhances the astroturfing comments’ persuasive power. The same is true of inoculation 
messages: simply because a one-time inoculation proves to be inefficient or loses its effect 
after a while, this does not mean that inoculation is an ineffective strategy. It seems plausible 
that multiple treatments would sustain the immunization or might even increase it by 
aggregating the effects of the single treatments. The question of how repeated exposure 
influences the persuasive effects of astroturfing comments, and those of inoculation 
messages, represents a promising avenue for future research. 
Moreover, we conducted our experiment within one (the German) context only, based 
on the assumption that the basic psychological effects investigated in this study would be 
broadly valid across cultural contexts. Future research is needed to bolster this assumption, 
and our claims to generalizability, by replicating similar experimental designs in other 
sociopolitical settings. Context-dependent characteristics of participants that might moderate 
the effects reported in this study may include: participants’ prior knowledge about Russia’s 
foreign propaganda efforts, their levels of education, their general attitude towards Russia, 
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their political ideologies, their migration backgrounds, as well as their personal ties with 
Russians. Unfortunately, except for age, gender, and education, based on our data, we were 
not able to test for potentially moderating variables (see Table 5 in the Online Appendix).
In addition, in this study we tested our hypotheses across three issues, which were all 
related to Russia’s involvement in political events that had occurred outside Germany. As our 
findings show, the persuasive impact of astroturfing comments differed greatly between the 
three issues. Against this backdrop, a key task for further research appears to be to 
incorporate a broader range of issues in future research designs, and to specify the reasons for 
issue-specific differences. In this context, we think the role of perceived issue relevance and 
involvement deserves more research attention. Particularly from a theoretical perspective, 
issue involvement is an interesting factor, because it is assumed to moderate simultaneously 
the effects of persuasive (Petty & Cacioppo, 1984) and inoculation messages (Pfau et al., 
1997). Moreover, in the context of inoculation, involvement has not only been shown to serve 
as an independent or moderating variable, but can also be the result of inoculation messages 
(Compton & Pfau, 2004). Developing an integrative theoretical framework describing the 
complex role of involvement in both contexts would be a promising task for future research.
Finally, the astroturfing comments used, were designed as grounded in only one – 
even though arguably the most prevalent – argumentative technique deployed in Russia’s 
recent disinformation campaigns: that of denying the principal’s (Russia’s) responsibility for 
a negative event, and of offering alternative explanations. Going beyond this study, future 
research could explore how audiences can most efficiently be inoculated against other 
common propaganda techniques, such as pointing to a general “Russophobia” or 
discrimination against Russians, ironizing the accusations, or relativizing the breaches of 
norms (“everybody does this”) (EU vs. Disinformation, 2019). By following up on these and 
related paths, future research can theorize and investigate in significantly more depth the 
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mechanisms that facilitate the disconcerting persuasive potential of disinformation and 
discover promising strategies for minimizing its harmful effects on democratic life.
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Figure 1
Experimental design
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Figure 2
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Figure 3
Effects of astroturfing comments and inoculation treatments on opinion-certainty change
N = 995 participants initially indicating that Russia/Syria was responsible for the event 
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Figure 4
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Materials Supplementary to Article 
The disconcerting potential of online disinformation: Persuasive effects of astroturfing 
comments and three strategies for inoculation against them
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Table 1 Perceived argument strength in online astroturfing comments (pretest results)
Argument strength
M (SD) α
Syria (N = 19)
Comment 1: “Like Assad's the only one with poison gas. What about the 
thousands of IS henchmen? If someone is known for massacring civilians, 
then it's probably them.”
3.71 (0.85) 0.91
Comment 2: “Nothing's proved! Wouldn't be the first time somebody invented 
weapons of mass destruction to wage a fucking war.”
3.59 (1.21) 0.97
Overall strength 3.65 (0.94) 0.94
Skripal (N = 20)
Comment 1: “So the guy was a proven double agent and had connections to 
the mafia. There were a lot of other people who wanted to kill him.”
2.73 (1.18) 0.96
Comment 2: “If the Russians wanted Skripal dead, they simply would have 
done it without leaving traces. But no, they used a poison that directly points 
to them. Right!”
3.01 (1.41) 0.96
Overall strength 2.87 (1.21) 0.96
US election (N = 17)
Comment 1: “Russian wire-pullers? Yeah sure! Cold-blooded economic 
interests are behind the election manipulations: Facebook, Cambridge 
Analytica. Do I need to say any more?”
2.65 (1.02) 0.93
Comment 2: “Nothing's proved! It wouldn't be the first time someone 
manipulated an election to gain power in the country.”
3.32 (1.02) 0.95
Overall strength 2.99 (0.81) 0.91
* N = 58 participants took part in the pretest and indicated argument strength on a bipolar 
scale from 1 to 5 using the following items: not convincing – convincing, weak – strong, 
implausible – plausible, incorrect – correct. All items were used to construct a scale indicating 
the perceived strength of each argument.
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M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD)
Syria 
(n = 657)
0.11c (1.02) 0.33 (1.12) 0.40ae (1.01) 0.28 (0.96) 0.08c (1.04)
Skripal 
(n = 685)
0.06bcd (0.83) 0.60ae (1.15) 0.36a (1.21) 0.41a (0.94) 0.24b (1.14)
US election 
(n = 722)
0.18 (1.03) 0.33 (0.98) 0.36 (1.08) 0.36 (0.99) 0.31 (0.95)
All issues 
(N = 2,064)
0.12bcd (0.96) 0.42ae (1.08) 0.37ae (1.10) 0.35ae (0.96) 0.22bc (1.05)
Group comparisons are based on linear multiple regression analysis using the inoculation 
factor as a dummy variable. Superscripts indicate significant mean differences (p < .05) 
between the groups (a = Teaser only, b = Teaser with astroturfing comments, c = Inoculation: 
Threat only, d = Inoculation: Refutational-different, e = Inoculation: Refutational-same).
Page 35 of 43
https://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/nms

















































































M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD)
Syria 
(n = 331)
0.44c (1.26) 0.63 (1.12) 0.89ae (1.18) 0.74 (0.98) 0.42c (1.32)
Skripal 
(n = 349)
0.26bcd (1.26) 0.84a (1.24) 0.90a (1.34) 0.69a (1.12) 0.51 (1.28)
US election 
(n = 315)
0.31 (1.05) 0.39 (0.84) 0.40 (1.07) 0.62 (1.22) 0.35 (0.96)
All issues 
(N = 995)
0.34bcd (1.19) 0.64a (1.11) 0.75ae (1.23) 0.68ae (1.11) 0.43cd (1.19)
*Participants stating that Russia / Syria was responsible for the event depicted (pre-stimulus 
opinions 4 or 5). Positive values indicate higher opinion uncertainty. Group comparisons are 
based on linear multiple-regression analysis using the inoculation factor as a dummy variable. 
Superscripts indicate significant mean differences (p < .05). (a = Teaser only, b = Teaser with 
astroturfing comments, c = Inoculation: Threat only, d = Inoculation: Refutational-different, e 
= Inoculation: Refutational-same).
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M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD)
Short delay
(n =1,107)
0.12 (0.97) 0.35 (1.14) 0.34 (1.12) 0.41 (0.96) 0.09a (1.02)
Long delay
(n = 957)
0.12 (0.95) 0.50 (0.99) 0.42 (1.08) 0.29 (0.96) 0.36a (1.06)
Group comparisons represent simple main effects of delay. Superscripts indicate significant 
mean differences between short- and long-delay conditions within a single inoculation group 
(p < .05).
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Table 5 Moderation of astroturfing effects by age, education, and gender 
Attitude change Attitude certainty change
Syria Skripal US 
election
Overall Syria Skripal US 
election
Overall
Age1 0.001 n.s. -0.015 n.s. -0.008 n.s. -0.007 n.s. -0.006 n.s. -0.025 n.s. 0.003 n.s. -0.009 n.s.
Education2 0.003 n.s. 0.012 n.s. 0.007 n.s. 0.001 n.s. 0.000 n.s. 0.001 n.s. 0.001 n.s. 0.000 n.s.
Gender2 0.002 n.s. 0.017 n.s. 0.005 n.s. 0.000 n.s. 0.006 n.s. 0.003 n.s. 0.002 n.s. 0.003 n.s.
1Unstandardized coefficient of interaction term (astroturfing*age) within linear regression 
model.
2Partial Eta² of interaction terms (astroturfing*gender, astroturfing*education) within 
ANOVA model.
***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05
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Figure I Inoculation messages (Skripal issue)
Thread only
Translation: [Title] Beware of fake profiles [Text] Russian trolls are increasingly active on 
social networks like Facebook. They use fake profiles to sway the opinions of other users in a 
pro-Russian direction. Recently, troll comments have been frequently observed, particularly 
in the context of the assassination attempt on agent Sergei Skripal.
Refutational-different
Translation: [Title] Beware of fake profiles [Text] Russian trolls are increasingly active on 
social networks like Facebook. They use fake profiles to sway the opinions of other users in a 
pro-Russian direction. Recently, troll comments have been frequently observed, particularly 
in the context of the assassination attempt on agent Sergei Skripal. In their comments, the 
trolls often spread alternative explanations for the events to . In this way, Russia is to be to 
exculpated and put in a good light. However, their explanations do not correspond to the truth.
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Translation: [Title] Beware of fake profiles [Text] Russian trolls are increasingly active on 
social networks like Facebook. They use fake profiles to sway the opinions of other users in a 
pro-Russian direction. Recently, troll comments have been frequently observed, particularly 
in the context of the assassination attempt on agent Sergei Skripal. The trolls usually state two 
things in their comments:
 Not Russia, but another actor (e.g. the mafia or another secret service) is responsible 
for the attempted murder.
 The clues were deliberately placed so that Russia is suspected. This is particularly 
applies to the Russian nerve toxin that was used.
In this way, Russia is to be to exculpated and put in a good light. However, their explanations 
do not correspond to the truth. Independent reports suggest that Russia is responsible for the 
murder attempt.
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Figure II Issue-specific news teasers (including astroturfing comments)
Skripal issue
Translation: [Title] Who poisoned ex-spy Skripal? Multiple countries claim it was Russia. 
[Caption] Russian secret service suspected [Comment 1] So the guy was a proven double 
agent and had connections to the mafia. There were a lot of other people who wanted to kill 
him. [Comment 2] If the Russians wanted Skripal dead, they simply would have done it 
without leaving traces. But no, they used a poison that directly points to them. Right!
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Translation: [Title] In the past year, more than 150 people were killed during gas attacks in 
Syria. Multiple countries claim it was Assad. [Caption] Syrian government suspected 
[Comment 1] Like Assad’s the only one with poison gas. What about the thousands of IS 
henchmen? If someone is known for massacring civilians, then it's probably them. [Comment 
2] Nothing's proved! Wouldn't be the first time somebody invented weapons of mass 
destruction to wage a fucking war.
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Translation: [Title] Did Russia manipulate the US presidential election? The country is in the 
focus of ongoing investigations [Caption] Russia suspected [Comment 1] Russian wire-
pullers? Yeah sure! Cold-blooded economic interests are behind the election manipulations: 
Facebook, Cambridge Analytica. Do I need to say any more? [Comment 2] Nothing's proved! 
It wouldn't be the first time someone manipulated an election to gain power in the country.
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